**From ‘Disagreement’ to Contrareity as Philosophical Focus:**

**The Need for an Epistemology for Domains of Controversial Views**

Abstract. There is a great deal of psychographic diversity which we humans exhibit, with the vast majority of it coming within domains of controversial views. If there are universal norms and virtues attaching to dialogue across domains of controversial views (philosophy, morals, religion, and politics), then these universal norms and virtues must be informed by psychology and the human sciences , and not merely source in an “ideal theory” of cognitive judgment. Non-ideal theory connects philosophy with psychology and with ecological rationality; it acknowledges the effects of uncertainty and ignorance on human judgment. This evidential ambiguity, or standing “underdetermination” problem, and the vast literature on bias as studied in psychology, cannot but suggest that “belief” in these domains are disanalogous to cases of memory of a given fact such as the amount of a dinner check, etc. epistemologists to question the of a focus on propositional disagreement, and master principles for judgment to obey. A focus on “difference” often, in our psychology, grounds uniqueness/specialness and superiority in human psychology. Many of our deepest held beliefs are culturally inherited, or culturally “nurtured,” and this is another reason why the vast psychographic differences humans display across domains of controversial views is poorly approached as disagreement.

 Those who instead focus on something as broad as Rawls calls a “comprehensive conceptions of good” reduction of contrariety to propositional disagreements much contemporary epistemology of disagreement a mistake. The farthest or most rhetorical extremes in debates like those over science and religion for example, “belief,” and propositional disagreement may actually be used as success terms. Clusters of belief which hang together and involve with holistic weighing of a large number of factors including pragmatic factors, are not well represented through propositions.

So the paper argues that the grounds and limits of reasonable disagreement are obscured by application of the rational uniqueness thesis to domains of controversial views. Whether disagreements are real or are glorified constructs depends upon what we want to say is the “richness” of evidential ambiguity in an exchange, and in one or more particular domain. More positively it develops an epistemology for domains of controversial views which is sensitive to nonideal theory and to holistic evaluation and how it helps to ground reasonable pluralism. But the question is not so much to clarify likeness within agreement, or disparity in disagreement. The concept of contrariety suggests new resources. Arguably, there is sometimes more likeness in the sense of *etiological* symmetries among some those who describe themselves as disagreeing over beliefs, and who are themselves hyper-focused on differences of ideology, sectarian theology, race or gender, etc. the contrariety between them is not ‘deep disagreement’ can be among the most shallow, when it correlates with (“mirrors”) specific personal or group biases. Epistemologists need to connect underdetermination in the forms of uncertainty, ignorance, and most especially *risk,* when psychological study of the overdetermination of beliefs in these domains by personological factors. This shift is what allows for a handle on studying extreme beliefs, and treating them appropriately rather than glorifying them. Overdetermination, which the paper will endeavor to relate to philosophy and psychology of risk, is often made manifest in strongly asymmetric trait-ascriptions ( ascriptions of vice or bias to group outsiders), for examples, or self-assertion of epistemic success (truth and knowledge possession).