

## Basic Moral Certainties, Deep Disagreements, and Cognitive Command

In *Truth and Objectivity*, Crispin Wright investigates the ways in which discourse about morality can be truth-apt without holding a realist stance. Nevertheless, he does not exclude realists from the debate by offering his minimalist conception of truth against the deflationary accounts. On his account, the talk of representation of the facts or the correspondence relation to the facts is the correct philosophical attitude on the truth-predicate. The applicability of truth-aptness, he argues, could be neutral within a discourse between realism and anti-realism (1992: 27). That is, truth ought to be regarded as *seriously dyadic* (1992: 83).

Wright then introduces the criterion of Cognitive Command as a sort of test for a given discourse to count as minimally truth-apt. If a discourse exerts Cognitive Command, it guarantees that judgment in that discourse will be representational –reliably track mind-independent reality. However, he argues that even if a discourse exhibit Cognitive Command, realists should also ensure the *Correspondence Platitude*, the principle that a true proposition is a proposition that corresponds accurately to reality. In light of these assumptions, he proposes a dilemma against moral realism, arguing that moral realism is defensible if and only if it is *a priori* that any moral disagreement between realists and anti-realists involves a cognitive shortcoming: A realist must choose either that all equally rational people would have a cognitive shortcoming in their moral disagreement without having a false belief about the dispute or that we cannot possibly have evidence for moral truths. In this paper, I shall argue against his key assumptions to be able to defend realism.

*Contra* Wright, I shall argue that realists do not have to accept that it is *a priori* that no moral disagreement is radical since we can show that the radical disagreement between realism and anti-realism is rooted in their basic moral certainties. That is, deep moral disagreements are indeed analogous to disagreements over basic moral certainties rather than beliefs (or any other cognitive state). In doing so, I will show that the radical (or deep) disagreement between realists and anti-realists is non-cognitive; their disagreement does not involve cognitive shortcomings.

To do so, I will give a general characterization of what hinges are based on Wittgenstein's claims in *On Certainty*. And following Nigel Pleasants, I will extend Wittgenstein's inquiry into basic moral certainties while giving a response against Pleasants' naturalistic explanation. Then, I will examine how disagreement might occur in Wittgensteinian hinges and claim that what it changes in disagreements over moral hinges is the same as in the cases of empirical hinges. In what follows, I will show that the subject matter of this change refers to a deep disagreement. This line of argument, I believe, the disagreement between realists and anti-realists is a kind of deep disagreement over basic moral certainties, which cannot be rationally resolvable.