

Gnostic Agreement Norms

According to a simple account of the nature of agreement (see Rowbottom (2016)), we agree that p if only if we each believe that p . But when is it epistemically appropriate to be in agreement with another agent? Intuitively there are several situations in which it is epistemically inappropriate to engage in agreement; for example, situations where one party enters into an agreement just to please the other party, or to be well appreciated, or to avoid conflicts, among others. In such cases, even if there is some prudential reason to engage in the agreement, there is no epistemic reason for doing so. In order to ascertain the conditions that make the agreement epistemically appropriate, our main question in this talk is as follows: what is the epistemic norm for agreements? In this talk, we want to argue for gnostic agreement norms. ‘Gnosticism’ is the account that the fundamental epistemic good is knowledge (see Williamson (2000), Littlejohn and Dutant (2021)). Thus, according to gnostic agreement norms, the central guideline for agreements is the *telos* of knowledge, such that a subject ought engage in an agreement that would probably result in gaining knowledge. We will begin by employing a useful distinction in *normativity theory* between evaluative and prescriptive norms (see McHugh (2012) and Simion, Kelp, and Ghijsen (2016)). On the basis of this normative framework we argue for a gnostic evaluative norm of agreement, according to which S engaging in an agreement that p is a good doxastic attitude only if this results in S ’s *knowing* that p . And we argue for a gnostic prescriptive norm of agreement, according to which S must engage in an agreement that p only if this results in S ’s having *good cognitive dispositions* in agreeing and believing that p . In this defense we use, apply, and expand the epistemological framework conceived by Williamson (2021a), (2021b) and Lasonen-Aarnio (2021a), (2021b).

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