**A Many-on-Many Model of Religious Peerhood**

Debates on the epistemology of disagreement have focused mainly on the normative question of *what the reasonable response to peer disagreement is* (N1)*.* To answer N1, epistemologists usually address a descriptive question regarding epistemic peerhood: *Do A and B consider one another epistemic peers regarding P?* If the answer is negative, it is usually argued that the disagreement is not a considerable threat to their beliefs regarding P (unless one sees the other as one’s epistemic superior in that matter). But if the answer is affirmative, investigating N1 begins.

It appears, however, that another normative question (N2) has been almost entirely neglected: *Should A and B consider one another as epistemic peers regarding P?* This suggests that it is possible, at least *in principle*, that there are cases in which A and B do not consider each other as epistemic peers, but they are nevertheless, rationally required to do so. As it should be clear, an affirmative response to N2 should considerably affect the way we respond to N1. Thus, it is certainly worth consideration.

In this paper, I will focus on how we should address N2 with respect to religious beliefs: *Should theists and atheists consider one another as epistemic peers regarding their religious beliefs?* To answer this question, I first examine several definitions of epistemic peerhood discussed in the literature. I will criticize each and eventually adopt the best possible option available: A and B are epistemic peers if and only if they are roughly equal with respect to their evidential and cognitive capacities. Next, I will raise two possible symmetry breakers between theists and atheists: the difference in their epistemic standards and the possibility of forming beliefs on religious experiences. I will argue that neither can break the epistemic symmetry between the theist and the atheist with respect to cognitive and evidential equality.

Finally, I will try to shed some light on the fact that religious disagreement is rarely a disagreement between two specific individuals. Instead, most of the time, what challenges the rationality of my religious beliefs is the observation that many people with comparable cognitive and evidential competencies disagree with me. As a result, I will try to develop a many-on-many model of disagreement on which there are people with comparable cognitive and evidential competencies. Some of these people agree with me, while others disagree with me regarding my religious beliefs. I will argue that I am required to acquire a their-person perspective in identifying my peers in this model, and consequently, I *should* identify these people with roughly equal cognitive and evidential competencies as my peers.

In general, I will show that we are required to recognize those with comparable cognitive and evidential beliefs as our epistemic peers with respect to our religious beliefs. Since there are such people in the world, I will conclude that disagreeing with those peers imperils our religious beliefs. I will, however, not discuss N1 here as it is beyond the scope of this paper.